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After years of underperformance following poor sales of Wii U, Nintendo seems to have won the investors’ 
praise all over again with its blockbuster Switch console. In this paper, we attempt to forecast how its sales 
and other value drivers affect the free cash flow available and whether the high current share price is 
justified. The outcomes of our study might be useful, among others, for industry analysts and academic 
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▪ Given the current price of ¥43,970, we recommend selling 
Nintendo with a target price of ¥41,447.26, as the buy investment 
represents a negative return of -4.57%, including an expected 
dividend of ¥512.2. 
▪ Nintendo operates on a growing 13.4% YoY console 
market worth $47.9 billion but is at risk of missing out future value 
creation opportunities related to streaming, as the company is far 
behind the competition on that front. 
▪ Launched in 2017, Switch is the second fastest selling 
console in Nintendo’s history. Marketed as both a home console 
and a handheld, Switch has the potential to become one of the 
best-selling consoles ever. Revenues more than doubled from 
¥489 billion to ¥1,056 trillion in the year Switch was launched. 
▪ However, even with an assumption of 135 million lifecycle 
unit sales for Switch, which would make it the third best-selling 
console, Nintendo appears overvalued, both intrinsically and 
relatively to its peers. 
▪ There is also an ongoing litigation against Nintendo related 
to poor manufacturing of controllers for Switch. Should the 
company lose it, it might have to spend approximately ¥36 billion 
replacing failed equipment and suffer an adverse effect on its 
reputation.  
Company description 
Nintendo is a Japanese manufacturer of home entertainment 
products. The Tokyo-listed company is best known for its handheld 
and home video game systems, such as Game Boy, Wii and, most 
recently, Switch. Nintendo is also actively engaged in producing 
content for its platforms, including IP like Mario, Legend of Zelda 
and Pokémon. 
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Nintendo was originally founded in 1899 in Kyoto, Japan, initially producing 
playing cards traditional for Japan. It was not until the 1970s when Nintendo 
entered an arising market of video game hardware and software, which defines 
the company today. Nintendo’s first widely successful video game console was 
Nintendo Entertainment System (NES), launched in 1983 in Japan and in 1985 in 
North America. Throughout its lifetime, NES sold 61.91 million units around the 
world and helped Super Mario Bros., the game it was bundled with, become one 
of the best-selling video games in history. 1988 marked the launch of Game Boy, 
a handheld system, which established Nintendo’s foothold across both form 
factors. 
From that point on, Nintendo produced 11 standalone consoles (Table 1). 
Throughout this journey, Nintendo has been constantly innovating with the 
concepts of its hardware products, with some examples including Nintendo DS, a 
foldable handheld with an additional touchscreen (later hardware update, 3DS 
added 3D effects) and Wii, a home console which featured unique motion 
controls and promoted more active gaming. Switch, Nintendo’s latest product, is 
a hybrid platform that allows a seamless transition between the two gaming 
modes. When it comes to software, Nintendo sticks to its well-known IP without 
making too many changes from generation to generation, while also allowing 
third-party developers to distribute their content across Nintendo’s platforms. 
Over the 40 years in the video game business, Nintendo has sold more than 710 
million hardware units and more than 4.5 billion video games. Nintendo of today 
is largely the same company it was 30 years ago: out of ¥1.2 trillion revenues 
reported in 2019, 96% is attributed to its dedicated video game hardware and 
software division, with mobile, licensing, and playing cards taking up the rest 
(Chart 1 and Chart 2). After going through some bad years following the poor 
performance of its then flagship console Wii U in the first half of the 2010s, 
Nintendo’s most recent console, Switch, is a huge commercial success. The 
gross margin is 41.7%, while the net profit margin is 16.21%, up from 3.27% just 
three years ago. 
At ¥5.79 trillion ($53 billion), Nintendo is the single largest pure video game 
company in the world. Two of its biggest competitors are much larger, but gaming 
is less core to their business models. Sony, at ¥9.42 trillion market cap, derives 
only about 27% of its revenue from its Game & Network Services division, while 
for Microsoft ($1.2 trillion market cap) gaming contributes less than 10% of 
revenue. This discrepancy in size puts Nintendo in a tough spot, as both Sony 
and Microsoft seem more resilient to any downturn in their gaming businesses, 
Table 1: Selected Nintendo Consoles 
Chart 1: Nintendo´s Revenues 2015-
2019 
Chart 2: Revenues by Category 
 
 








having the cushion of other divisions. Yet Nintendo’s grip on its market is strong: 
for the last year, the share price is up more than 50% and is 292% higher than 
the 5-year low in February 2015 (Chart 3). 
Shareholder structure 
Nintendo is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and currently has 131,669,000 
shares outstanding. Nintendo’s biggest shareholder is JP Morgan Chase with a 
stake 10.74%, followed by The Master Trust Bank of Japan (4.99%), Japan 
Trustee Services Bank (4.65%), The Bank of Kyoto (4.10%) and the Nomura 
Trust and Banking Co. (3.53%). In terms of distribution of ownership, foreign 
institutions and individuals collectively own 49.20% of the company and 
Japanese financial institutions own 26.43%, while 9.53% are constituted by 
treasury shares, 8.48% is owned by Japanese individuals and others, and the 
remaining 6.36% is owned by Japanese securities firms and other Japanese 
corporations (Chart 4). 
As evident, a large part of Nintendo is owned by Japanese banks, which is part of 
a larger practice of cross-shareholding common in corporate Japan. Listed 
companies in the country hold chunks of one another, which constitute up to 20% 
of the local equities’ valuations. As much as it is widespread, cross-shareholding 
has been called into question for two main reasons: it creates an entanglement of 
companies that will make the whole market more vulnerable during turbulent 
times, and it gives corporate executives too much comfort, as cross-shareholders 
tend to vote in favor of management decisions. In 2018, the Japanese financial 
regulator revised the corporate governance code to restrict cross-shareholding, 
but the progress country-wise has been slow. In this light, Nintendo is making 
significant progress on corporate governance: in February 2019, Bank of Kyoto 
announced that it would reduce its stake in Nintendo, the bank’s biggest holding. 
To compensate for the selling pressure, Nintendo announced a simultaneous 
share buyback and cancellation of some treasury shares. Finally, to diversify its 
investor base towards retail, the company placed more shares with retail 
investors. 
On that front, however, much remains to be done. In early 2018, evident success 
of Switch pushed Nintendo’s share price above ¥48,000, close to a 10-year high, 
and effectively out of reach for many retail investors, considering that Tokyo 
Stock Exchange imposes a minimum order of 100 shares. Consequently, 
Nintendo faced investor pressure to split its stock to broaden the shareholder 
base, which, the argument went, would display a commitment to greater 
transparency. Up to this date, Nintendo did not make any plans regarding the 
Chart 3: Nintendo´s Stock Price (JPY) 
Chart 4: Nintendo´s Distribution of 
Ownership 
Chart 5: Nintendo´s Stock Price 
(Dec/09 – March/18) 












stock split, but in early 2019 the company’s spokesperson said the measure was 
considered an option. 
The Sector 
Overview of the video game market 
Often overlooked as a younger form of entertainment, the video game market 
has quietly grown to what is estimated at $152 billion globally (Wijman, 2019), 
potentially reaching $196 billion in 2022 (Chart 6). That is more than the $96.8 
billion movie industry and far above the music with its $19.1 billion (Vanian, 
2019).  To name some examples underscoring such success, Grand Theft Auto 
V, released in 2013, became the highest-grossing media title of all time, making 
$6 billion in sales with a budget of $265 million. Fortnite, a free-to-play online 
game, grew its user base exponentially (Chart 7) and reached 250 million players 
worldwide in March 2019 (Gough, 2019). In the US, e-sports are estimated to 
have more viewers than any other sport other than NFL by 2021 (Syracuse 
University, 2019) and it is expected to reach worldwide market revenue of $1.7 
billion (Chart 8 and Chart 9). 
On the macro level, there are three main categories defining video games (Chart 
10). First, there is the Console market, valued at $47.9 billion annually and 
growing 13.4% YoY. This category includes dedicated hardware, sold as a home 
or handheld console, and the software meant to be played (often exclusively) on 
that hardware. There are three key winners in consoles: Nintendo, Sony, and 
Microsoft, which have been dominating the space for years and have customers 
effectively locked it to their platforms, creating strong brand loyalty that is often 
carried across generations of consoles. Said generations are another defining 
feature: a console’s life cycle is about 5 to 7 years, after which console majors 
introduce their new hardware line-ups and slowly stop extending the software 
library for the outgoing generation to facilitate the migration of customers (Table 
2). Looking at the current generation, Sony appears to be the absolute winner 
with 103 million PlayStation 4 consoles sold, with Microsoft Xbox One (47 million 
units) and Nintendo Switch (35 million units) trailing behind. Seeing it this way, 
however, ignores two facts and distorts the real market shares. In 2015 Microsoft 
stopped reporting unit sales of its Xbox consoles, which means that there is no 
reliable way to gauge this metric anymore, but the move itself likely symbolizes 
weak sales. Then, Nintendo Switch was launched in March 2017, more than 
three years after the two other consoles. This explains the big gap in unit sales 
and shows that Nintendo does not necessarily come last in the race. On the 
contrary, when looking at consumer interest measured through e-commerce 
Chart 7: Fortnite User Base 
Chart 8: eSports Worldwide Audience 
Size (2012-2022) 
Chart 9: eSports Market Revenue (2012-
2022) 
Chart 10: Segmentation of Video Game 
Market (in Billion U.S. dollar) 
 
 








searches, Nintendo comes first (Bobrov, 2018) with a big lead over its 
competitors (Chart 11). 
Most consumers only buy one console in a generation – given that a home 
console costs north of $300 at launch and many popular games are available on 
more than one console (content producers, such as Activision Blizzard, Ubisoft or 
Take-Two Interactive, are often independent from the console majors and benefit 
from getting the widest possible distribution for their products). This creates 
immense pressure for Nintendo, Sony and Microsoft to entice consumers to their 
platforms. The main weapon in this race is software exclusives, produced by first-
party game development subsidiaries of each major. Such exclusive games 
require heavy investments but eventually differentiate the three platforms, similar 
in hardware, between one another (Chart 12). 
The second category is PC, worth $35.7 billion and growing 4.0% YoY (Chart 
13). Unlike the console market, PC is much more decentralized: although 
Microsoft boasts a heavy market presence with its Windows operating system, its 
open-end nature means that the company does not control the distribution of 
content the same it does in its Xbox ecosystem. This enabled the recent 
proliferation of smaller, indie games, created with limited resources of 
independent studies, and contributed greatly to many innovations in video 
games, with the vastly popular MOBA and battle royale genres tracing their roots 
back to the PC gaming. The abundance of these games far exceeds the ability of 
consumers to analyze all of them when deciding on a purchase. This means that 
the platform is practically controlled by the parties who control product discovery. 
In the case of PC, it is Valve and its Steam and, more recently, Epic Games, 
which used the money from the cash cow that is Fortnite to finance numerous 
exclusive deals for Epic Game Store (EGS), its upstart competitor to Steam. In 
2019 Steam reached (Lanier, 2019) one billion registered accounts and 90 million 
monthly active users, up 23 million from the year before (Chart 14). Such 
concentration creates somewhat of self-censorship for the content producers: 
even though there are no barriers to release a game on PC, independent studios 
are heavily incentivized to be present on Steam or EGS and, therefore, comply 
with their publishing rules and pay up to 30% fee on sales. PC also remains the 
major platform for e-sports, which is increasingly competing with traditional sports 
both in terms of viewership and prize pools (Chart 15).  
Last, but clearly not least, comes the mobile market with its hefty $68.5 billion, 
growing 10.2% YoY. Within this category, value is split between smartphone 
games with $54.9 billion (5.0% YoY growth) and $13.6 billion (11.6% YoY 
growth) in tablet games (Chart 16). Mobile games have enjoyed great success 
over the past decade, as smartphones were equipped with an increasingly bigger 
Table 2: Console Generations 
Chart 11: Search Breakdown by 
Console (April/2017 – March/2018) 
Chart 12: Number of Exclusive Games 
by Console (until Dec/2019) 
Chart 13: PC Game Market by 
Category (in Billion) 
 
 








screen and powered with hardware matching this of low-end PCs. Even more 
importantly, mobile reached a wide audience, particularly in emerging markets, 
that could not afford a dedicated console or an expensive gaming PC. The 
distribution model had to adapt as well – most mobile games are free-to-play 
(F2P), contrasted with a standard $60 per AAA game on consoles. Despite being 
nominally free, these games offer in-game purchases that allow faster progress 
or some kind of advantage over other players. The distribution of paying players 
is heavily skewed, with less than 3% of all players paying any money for such 
content, and the top decile of those contributing 46% of all revenues, effectively 
subsidizing the costs of game development and subsequent maintenance 
(Johnson, 2014). Yet the overall revenue from mobile games is hard to 
overestimate: market leaders such as Clash Royale rack up $2.3 million daily in 
player spending, while cash flows from gaming allow Tencent, a Chinese tech 
giant, to keep other, less profitable products, such as its super-app WeChat, 
afloat.  
In terms of geographies, 47% of the video game market value comes from Asia-
Pacific (50% of which is attributed to China), followed by North America (26%), 
EMEA (23%) and Latin America (4%) (Chart 17). Due to its reliance on Asia, the 
video game market is vulnerable to any major shift in this area. One of the latest 
examples was a regulatory crackdown in China, which imposed rules that prohibit 
gamers under 18 to play online between 22:00 and 08:00 and restrict gaming to 
90 minutes on weekdays and three hours on weekends and holidays (BBC, 
2019). 
Growth drivers for the industry 
One of the most transformative trends of the past decade was the emergence of 
games as a service (GaaS), similar to software as a service (SaaS) that changed 
the business software landscape. Traditionally, content producers would invest in 
producing games that were fully finished upon their market release, and only then 
they would repay their investment by selling individual copies of the game. The 
profit, if there is any, would be reinvested into producing the developers’ next 
game. With GaaS, games get post-release support in the form of new content, 
which keeps players engaged and willing to pay more. The most popular ways of 
monetizing such service are microtransactions, which involve selling minor in-
game content for a low price (e.g. rare clothing for a game character), and 
subscription/season passes, which restrict access to new content to paying 
users. Most successful service-based games, like Fortnite, utilize both methods. 
Free-to-play games have made $87.7 billion in Revenue in 2018 and the top 10 
games have made more than $13 billion (Chart 18). While producing blockbuster 
Chart 14: Number of Steam Active 
Users by year (in Million) 
Chart 15: Leading eSports Games in 
2019, by cumulative tournament prize 
pool (in Million U.S. dollar) 
Chart 16: Mobile Game Market by 
Category (in Billion) 












games is a highly unpredictable business, running a few popular GaaS brings in 
steady revenue streams, which increases the value of companies in this 
segment. Clear evidence of this is presented in a 2018 study (Batchelor, 2018) 
that attributes the $80 billion combined growth (since 2012) of Electronic Arts and 
Activision Blizzard, two game publishers, largely to their GaaS efforts (Chart 19). 
But gamers’ reception to post-release monetization was mixed at best, with many 
being disappointed about having to pay extra after buying a $60 title. This can 
have a clear impact on GaaS going forward: following public outrage, Electronic 
Arts decided to remove in-game paid “loot boxes” from one of its biggest titles, 
Star Wars Battlefront 2, while the EU gambling regulators decided to investigate 
the practice (Kent, 2019). 
The next big trend is streaming, which already disrupted the adjacent movies and 
music markets. Mostly due to technical reasons, streaming found it much harder 
to penetrate the video game market. Whereas streaming movies only requires 
one-way download from the server, which can be cached to smooth out ups and 
downs in the internet connection, the interactive nature of video games requires 
continuous back-and-forth communication with the server, and the speed of this 
communication, if not sufficient, can ruin the experience or even render some 
games unplayable. This means that streaming video games requires a very fast, 
unlimited internet connection, which naturally limits the addressable user base. 
Despite all these limitations, there have been several attempts to break into video 
game streaming, and right now we are arguably witnessing another wave of such 
efforts. OnLive, a California-based video game streaming service, announced its 
platform as early as 2009, but delivered poor user experience and ended up 
selling most of its assets to Sony, where they were used in Sony’s own streaming 
offering, PlayStation Now. Introduced in 2014, PlayStation Now had a slow start 
and, priced at $19.99/month, could not win a large audience despite Sony’s 
impressive back catalog. 
The opportunity for streaming video games is theoretically so large that even 
Alphabet, having no material presence in gaming before, decided to join the race. 
In early 2019 the company unveiled Google Stadia – a video game streaming 
platform that leverages Google’s technological might to offer high-quality (up to 
4K) game streaming with little downtime. Yet there is little evidence that Alphabet 
will successfully capture a significant market share (Hollister, 2019) – Stadia 
launched in November 2019 without many announced features but with a 
questionable pricing model – unlike Netflix’s subscription for unlimited access to 
its library, Stadia’s subscription will only give access to its streaming 
infrastructure, with users then having to pay full price for any game they want to 
Chart 18: Top 10 Free to Play Games 
Revenue in 2018 (in Billion U.S. dollar) 
Chart 19: Market Cap Growth in 
Billion U.S. dollar (2012-2018) 
 
 








enjoy on Stadia. Given Google’s history of quickly abandoning underperforming 
products, the streaming future of video gaming might not be there just yet. 
That, however, does not necessarily mean that Netflix - like subscription services 
are not fit to video games – if we overlook the lack of instant streaming, there is 
quite some evidence pointing to the contrary. 2019 saw the launch of numerous 
subscription-based services that give users access to wide libraries of ready-to-
download games. With this model, the technological edge becomes secondary to 
the quality of the game library. Therefore, it is not surprising that two out of three 
main subscription services launched in 2019 are owned not by console majors, 
but by big content publishers – namely Electronic Arts (best known for FIFA and 
Need for Speed series) and Ubisoft (Assassin’s Creed and Far Cry). The third 
was Microsoft’s Xbox Game Pass, which brought many Xbox exclusives to 
Windows for the first time (Table 3). While it is too early to make conclusions 
about their performance, such services might be a viable option for consumers to 
move away from owning expensive games and for companies to de-risk their 
cash flows with recurring revenues. 
Nintendo’s positioning 
Up until 1994, Nintendo was an undeniable leader, combining its proprietary 
hardware with games that had a cult-like following. Then Sony introduced 
PlayStation that featured much more realistic graphics and sound and sold over 
102 million units. Nintendo’s response, Nintendo 64, sold only 33 million units. 
Things got worse in the next, sixth, generation. Not only PlayStation 2 was 
hugely successful (eventually it became the best-selling console ever with over 
155 million units sold), but Microsoft also entered the race. Meanwhile, 
GameCube, Nintendo’s sixth-generation entry, sold only 22 million units and was 
widely considered a failure (Table 4). 
In 2002 Satoru Iwata, a relatively low-profile game developer, took over as CEO 
of Nintendo. He recognized that games were increasingly revolving around 
realistic graphics and c complex gameplay mechanics demanded by the core 
audience. Iwata saw an opportunity to make a product for the non-core audience, 
differentiating Nintendo from the intense technological competition. The 
company’s first product under Iwata’s leadership, Nintendo DS, was hardly a 
technological breakthrough, but its small screens and lack of high-resolution 
sound meant that producing games for DS was relatively cheap, which in turn 
allowed game developers to experiment with different genres and formats and 
push the creative boundaries of the industry. Contrary to its past handheld 
console, Game Boy, Nintendo promoted DS to girls as well, offering a version in 
Table 3: Main Video Game Subscription 
Services 
Table 4: Best Selling Consoles 
 
 








pink. Nintendo DS was a huge success, selling 154 million copies worldwide 
throughout its lifetime. 
This approach of reaching a wider, non-target audience was at the core of 
Nintendo’s strategy ever since. As Iwata himself put it: 
“Many people in this industry tend to categorize our customers into two groups — 
one is the core gamer and the other is casual gamers…We want to create a kind 
of cycle where casual gamers are gradually growing up to become passionate 
players. In order to maintain that kind of cycle, we needed to break down the 
wall.” 
Nintendo’s next console, Wii, went even farther towards the casual gamers, 
replacing the traditional gamepad with many buttons, often confusing for non-
gamers, with a simple, motion-controlled remote. In terms of hardware capacity, 
Wii was purposely positioned miles behind its peers, PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360, 
instead offering a more reasonably-priced experience, both for developers and 
end-consumers (Table 5). The strategy worked, as Wii did not directly compete 
with consoles from Sony and Microsoft, capturing the wider non-core market all 
to itself. And even within the core gaming circles, the radically different gaming 
experience that Nintendo offered meant that owners of PlayStation and Xbox 
could open their wallets once again for Wii. The console sold 102 million copies 
in its lifetime, outselling both PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360 and becoming the 
fastest selling console of all time. Even more impressive, whereas Sony and 
Microsoft lost money on every console sold in order to gain market share, 
Nintendo was making unit profits. 
While Nintendo managed to intelligently avoid direct competition with other 
console majors, the upcoming revolution in mobile lured away the very casual 
gamers Nintendo was targeting. Ironically, high-end consoles of Sony and 
Microsoft were differentiated enough from mobile games to keep selling in the 
smartphone era, leaving Nintendo exposed. The pressure was so high that 
Nintendo’s management had to cut their salaries by 20% to 50%. Seeing the rise 
of tablets and tablet gaming (Chart 20), the Japanese company decided to 
counter the threat with a tablet of their own – Wii U. The new console received 
poor reviews, citing low-quality display and touchscreen, and sold only 13.6 
million units before Nintendo stopped supporting it in 2017. 
The lackluster performance of Wii U put Nintendo in a dire financial situation, and 
analysts urged the company to abandon the hardware altogether and turn to 
mobile gaming. For a while, the company listened. Nintendo partnered with a 
mobile game developer Niantic to create Pokémon Go. Released in 2016, the 
geolocation-based game became a cultural phenomenon, having its players walk 
Table 5: Consoles Prices in USA at the 
Release date 
Chart 20: Number of Global Users 
Mobile vs Desktop (in million) 
 
 








around real cities collecting Pokémon and fighting against one another. With over 
20 million daily users, Pokémon Go became the most popular mobile game, 
capturing a wide range of players across genders and generations (Chart 21). 
Nintendo also ventured into developing its own mobile games, utilizing some of 
its most famous franchises like Mario, Fire Emblem and Animal Crossing. Most of 
them were distributed for free but had in-game payments to unlock additional 
content. While most games did relatively well, it was not a tremendous success 
around which Nintendo could reinvent itself. And so, it went back to the console 
business. 
Iwata, a long-standing CEO of Nintendo, died at 55 in 2015. His last project was 
Nintendo Switch, a hybrid console that could be played at home as well as on the 
go. Launched in early 2017, Switch contained little to no functionality that was not 
related to gaming – while dashboards of PlayStation 4 and Xbox One had 
browsers, social features, and applications such as Netflix, Nintendo purposely 
stripped away all side features to focus on what it does best – games. 
In terms of software, Nintendo aimed for games that were much more complex 
than on mobile but still more accessible than those characterizing the other major 
consoles. Detachable controllers (called Joy-Cons) allowed for easy multiplayer 
with friends, while the multimodality of Switch once again left Nintendo competing 
against itself. The financial impact did not take too long, with Switch soon 
becoming the second fastest selling console after Wii. 
This would have been nearly impossible if Nintendo did not launch the console 
with some killer exclusive titles. The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild was one 
of the launch titles and it proved to be key to the success of Switch. The game 
received an average critic score of 97%, sold almost 15 million copies to date, 
and was the only game produced by a console major included in the Time’s list 
(Gault, 2019) of best games of the decade (production of another entry, 
Pokémon Go, was licensed to a third-party developer by Nintendo). Other launch 
titles, 12 in total, were mostly re-releases of much older games, which prompted 
some journalists to call Switch a “$400 Zelda machine” (Irving, 2017).  
Over time, more blockbuster exclusives followed, cementing the unique value 
proposition of Switch (Chart 22). As these games are only available on Switch, 
they boost adoption with consumers, which then serves as a proof point for third-
party publishers that the Switch user base is large enough to profitably port their 
games, which then expands the console’s library even further, and so on. 
Therefore, Nintendo is a huge benefiter from network effects, and the evidence 
suggests that Switch is past the inflection point. 
Chart 21: Peak Daily Active Users 
in USA (in million) 
Chart 22: Top Selling Nintendo Switch 
game Titles Worldwide as of September 
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In September 2019 Nintendo launched Switch Lite, a handheld-only spin-off of 
the main console that came at a 30% discount. Despite weaker hardware and 
lack of the hole “switching” promise, Switch Lite sold 1.95 million units in 10 days 
(Chart 23). What is even more indicative of consumer adoption is the fact that 
43% of buyers already owned a vanilla Switch (Webster, 2019). Some anecdotal 
evidence also suggests that parents increasingly use Switch as a platform for 
bonding with their children and buy more than one Switch per household. 
Nintendo also pointed out that there more female owners of Switch Lite 
compared to the company’s other products. All of this indicates that Nintendo is 
successfully expanding the user base and the sales momentum for Switch is far 
from over. And as we saw how Nintendo successfully sold the handheld version 
of Switch standalone, the company can employ a similar strategy on the opposite 
side of the spectrum, creating a hypothetical Switch Pro that would be home-only 
and technologically on par with Xbox and PlayStation. 
Based on Nintendo’s profile and history, for our valuation we assume the 
following trajectory for the company going forward: Nintendo will continue 
innovating with its hardware and leverage its strong IP and brand recognition 
(Kunst, 2019) to drive sales of these products (Chart 24), and sales of Switch will 
maintain its positive momentum (Webster, 2019). On the technological side, we 
do not see Nintendo having the capabilities or the strategical will to compete in 
cutting edge areas such as streaming with Sony, Microsoft or Google, and expect 
the company to stay on the sidelines of this arms race. Although the company 
evaluates the opportunity of streaming (Batchelor, 2019), it is way behind the 
competition: Sony’s PlayStation Now launched more than five years ago and 
counted a million users as of October 2019, while Microsoft has recently rolled 
out its own service, Project xCloud. The fact that the two other major companies 
in the streaming race are Google and Nvidia clearly shows that Nintendo, much 
more focused on content and experience, does not have the technological edge 
to compete on streaming. As for the game library subscription, similar to those of 
Electronic Arts and Ubisoft, our view is that repackaging the pricing around 
monthly fees will not produce an order of magnitude change in revenues since 
the success of this product will still depend on the quantity and quality of new 
games. For this reason and in the scope of this report, we assume that 
Nintendo’s business model, which is producing hardware and selling software in 
units, will change substantially in the forecasted period. Meanwhile, the company 
can do much more in terms of licensing its brands, either for mobile games, 
movies or theme parks, although all these segments will remain non-core for 
Nintendo. 
Chart 23: Units Sales of Nintendo´s 
Switch Lite in Q3 2019 
Chart 24: Brand Recognition among 
Gamers in USA 
 
 











As the “Dedicated video game hardware and software” division constitutes 
almost all of Nintendo’s revenue, forecasting the performance of that unit is key 
to this report. The keys assumptions we make about Nintendo’s revenues going 
forward concerns the sales of Switch. We assume that the console can sell 135 
million hardware units and almost 1 billion software units over its lifecycle, with 
residual sales afterwards. At this level, Switch is well-positioned to become the 
third best-selling console ever, after PlayStation 2 and Nintendo DS – although 
PlayStation 4, with its 102.8 million units sold and some lifetime left ahead, 
remains a close competitor. 
There are a few reasons we are bullish on Switch. First, Switch is both a home 
and a handheld console, which allows Nintendo to capture both of these 
segments simultaneously, although there is a sizeable overlap. In one of its 
investor presentations, Nintendo revealed that almost 20% of users use their 
Switches only as a home console and 30% only as a handheld, with the rest 
playing in both modes (Hulfish, 2017). To maintain the sales growth of Switch, 
Nintendo can follow up with updated models targeted for each of the modes: in 
September 2019 the company launched Nintendo Switch Lite, a handheld-only 
cheaper version that is now having a strong sales momentum. Following this 
approach, Nintendo can release another update now targeted at core gamers, 
with more computing power and at a higher price – a hypothetical Switch Pro. 
Second, although Switch is behind both PlayStation 4 and Xbox One in terms of 
computing power, the gap is not as large as it was in the past generations. That 
means that, with some limitations, many popular games from other platforms can 
be ported on Switch, which will attract players that are not big fans of Nintendo’s 
first-party content. As a recent example, The Witcher 3, one of the most 
successful games of this generation, got a late release on Switch. While many 
core gamers already own the game on other platforms, some decided to buy 
another copy on Switch to have the opportunity to play on the go. The port was a 
big success, contributing to a 38% YoY revenue increase for CD Projekt, the 
developer and publisher of the game (CD Projekt, 2019).  Third, while 
PlayStation 4 and Xbox One were released within a week in November 2013 and 
instantly entered in a fierce competition for the customer wallets, Switch was 
released only in March 2017, when, with no next generation in sight, gamers 
could more easily afford another console. Furthermore, as Sony and Microsoft 
 
 








introduce the ninth generation of consoles and focus on selling hardware, Switch 
can fill the content gap in that transition period. 
For these reasons, we see the Switch platform growing up until 2023, after which 
we expect it to be replaced by a successor console. The exact distribution of 
hardware unit sales can be found in Table 6 (it is worth noting that surprisingly 
low sales in 2017 are explained by the fact that, according to Nintendo’s 
methodology, the fiscal year of 2017 ends with March 2017, meaning that it 
includes less than one month of sales of Switch). In general, we assume that 
software sales on the Switch platform will follow hardware sales throughout the 
growth period; then the relationship will decouple with software having more 
inertia and thus falling slower as Switch approaches the end of its lifecycle. It is 
not clear how big, if any, will be the disruption of video game streaming services, 
but we believe that Nintendo is the incumbent most protected from it. Whereas 
pure software publishers such as Electronic Arts and Ubisoft face pressure to 
rethink their business models, Nintendo has its own, well-established distribution 
platform, and a heavy load of world-class IP necessary to lock customers into it. 
It is naïve to assume that this will be enough to fend off the challengers forever, 
but for the time being Nintendo has an upper hand. 
As for the prices, Nintendo does not disclose the average prices it sells Switch 
for, so we had to rely on our own research, which showed that Japan, Nintendo’s 
home market, has the cheapest Switch at ¥29,980, followed by Americas 
(32,548) and Europe (¥39,882). We expect little to no reduction until late in the 
console’s lifetime, as the consumer demand remains strong – although we model 
that, due to the introduction of the cheaper Switch Lite, the aggregate price will 
average down. In terms of revenue contribution, the Americas is the most 
important geography, bringing in 39% of the Switch hardware sales (Chart 25). 
Europe contributes 31.5%, Japan 20%, and the rest is made up of sales in other 
locations. We assume no substantial changes to this structure going forward. 
Additionally, we expect generally flat software prices throughout a console 
generation: video game prices tend to be rather sticky and, as we move further 
into the lifecycle of Switch, higher prices of new titles (due to inflation) will be 
countered by more discounts on older titles. 
After the new console is released, we expect both hardware and software sales 
of Switch to start contracting rapidly, and the fate of 3DS being replaced by 
Switch offers some guidance. We can see a pattern of hardware sales shrinking 
at about 50% a year (this is our assumption for Switch as well), while software 
sales decrease less rapidly as new games are still published for some time (we 
assume growth rates of -25%, -40%, -50% in 2024, 2025, and 2026 respectively). 
Table 6: Distributions of Switch 
Hardware Unit Sales 
Chart 25: Nintendo´s Revenue 
Contribution by Region 
 
 








As a result, during the transition period, the total revenues of the Switch platform 
will be driven mostly by software sales, contrary to the status quo (Chart 26). 
Given that it is far too early for Nintendo to reveal any details about its follow-up 
for Switch, for modeling purposes we assume that the console will have sales 
performance similar to that of Switch, although it will launch at a slightly higher 
price, incorporating the costs of superior hardware and inflation. We assume that 
the new console will launch at a price 20% higher than what Switch was originally 
sold for, which represents a compounded annual inflation of 2.63% over the 6-
year gap between the two events. Due to extreme uncertainty (Nintendo, has not 
confirmed any plans for a next-gen successor), we assume that the launch 
numbers to follow those of Switch for both hardware and software. 
Apart from sales of the Switch family and, starting from 2023, the new console, 
“Dedicated video game hardware and software” contains two other categories, 
namely 3DS and Others. As 3DS gets completely phased out without any 
hardware updates and barely any new games, we assume that sales will keep 
falling at a rate close to the one observed in 2019 (-66.5%) until this revenue 
stream becomes immaterial. Nintendo does not disclose much about the Other 
stream, other than saying that it includes amiibo (interactive action figures), 
Virtual Console (a line of retro video games published on Wii, Wii U, and 3DS, 
but not on Switch) and platforms other than 3DS or Switch (supposedly Wii U). 
Given how little visibility we have on this category and the fact that most of its 
drivers are related to retired consoles that will not be growing anymore, we felt 
comfortable assuming a three-year median growth rate equal to -30%. 
The other two divisions are “Mobile, IP related income, and others” (3.83% of 
total revenue in the last reported year) and “Playing cards” (0.16%). Similar to 
Other in the “Dedicated video game hardware and software” division, here 
Nintendo offers no meaningful breakdown and future guidance. A look into the 
company’s strategic statement, however, hints that we will see more IP-related 
business in the future: 
“For the IP expansion business, we intend to enhance the value of Nintendo IP 
by increasing the contact points with consumers in their everyday lives through 
collaborations with our corporate partners, including theme park projects, film, 
and merchandising.” 
In light of this, and the fact that Nintendo made the most downloaded iPhone 
game of 2019 (Webster, 2019), we believe that Nintendo can keep the fast pace 
of expansion (17%) in its “Mobile, IP related income, and others” division for the 
forecasted years. This view is supported by numerous projects in Nintendo’s 
pipeline, including the Super Nintendo World theme park (Radulovic, 2019) 
Chart 26: Nintendo Switch Hardware 
and Software Sales 
 
 








planned to be built in Japan in time for the 2020 Summer Olympics, and an 
upcoming Super Mario movie (BBC, 2018). 
Aggregated revenue forecast can be found in Chart 27. It is noticeable that the 
revenues tip down slightly from 2024 onwards. Our rationale here is that as 
Switch, a massive blockbuster with consumers, will be replaced, its success will 
be hard to replicate and, even though we assumed the same launch figures for 
the next consoles, it might not be enough to offset the drop in sales of Switch. 
The reason we did not a similar dynamic in 2017-2018 is that preceding years of 
underperformance created a low base effect and helped Nintendo achieve such 
explosive growth (revenues grew 119% from the fiscal year 2017 to 2018) – 
since Switch is clearly successful, that will not be the case when the next 
generation comes. 
Expenses 
Nintendo has a gross margin of 41.75% in 2019, with only minor fluctuations 
around that number in the previous years considered. Unfortunately, Nintendo 
provides neither a breakdown of these costs nor any strategic initiatives on 
whether they plan to optimize their supply chain. For this reason, we assume a 5-
year median gross margin in our forecast. 
In SG&A, the three biggest categories constitute 93% of total SG&A expenses. 
These categories are advertising, R&D, and salaries (Chart 28). The two major 
constituents of SG&A are advertising expenses and R&D. Advertising is largely 
pro-cyclical, with costs rapidly ramping up towards the launch of a new console. 
In the fiscal year of 2018 (which includes 9 months of 2017, right after the launch 
of Switch in March 2017) advertising expenses were ¥72.6 billion compared to 
¥48.7 billion the year before, representing a 50% spike, after which advertising 
expenses stabilize when expressed as a percentage of revenue. In our forecast, 
we project a similar, although not as drastic, a spike in advertising expenses in 
2024, which we expect to be the first full year of sales of the new console. 
R&D expenses include the development of hardware products and software for 
this hardware, as well as for smartphones. As is the case with many other 
categories in the annual report, the segment breakdown of R&D is omitted as 
Nintendo operates as a single business segment. For the lack of clear guidance, 
we assume that R&D will increase in absolute terms as Nintendo makes its way 
into the mobile market and catches up with competitors’ in functionality of its 
console operating systems (while both Xbox and PlayStation have wide ranges of 
side apps like YouTube and Netflix, Switch does not even have a web browser) 
but stays on par with recent years when expressed as a percentage of revenue. 
Source: Nintendo, own estimation 
Chart 27: Nintendo overall sales, ¥ m 
Source: Nintendo 
Chart 28: 2019 SG&A breakdown, ¥ m 
 
 








All the other lines included in SG&A were forecasted as either a 3-year or 5-year 
medians expressed as a percentage of revenue, depending on whether there 
were clear outliers. 
All the other lines included in SG&A were forecasted as either a 3-year or 5-year 
medians expressed as a percentage of revenue, depending on whether there 
were clear outliers. 
Working capital and CAPEX 
In terms of working capital activity ratios, Nintendo’s average holding period of 
inventory was 70.70 days in 2019, which is also the median throughout 2015-
2019. The average collection period of accounts receivable was 23.77 in 2019 (5-
year median of 28.02 days), while the average accounts payable period was 
31.15 days in 2019 (5-year median of 63.66 days). Bringing these three metrics 
together, the cash conversion cycle in 2019 was equal to 63 days in 2019 (5-year 
median of 39 days). For most working capital components, we assumed that they 
will converge to their 5-year median values going forward. An exception to this 
rule, the payable period was projected to remain on its level 2019 level of 31.15 
days, which was radically different from the years prior – 77.25 days in 2018 and 
131 days in 2017. Our rationale is that the launch of Switch drastically improved 
the financial situation of Nintendo and allowed it to pay its suppliers earlier, which 
long-term will allow the company to maintain good terms with the suppliers and 
stabilize the supply chain. On the asset side of working capital, we noticed that 
both account receivables and inventories increase throughout 2018, the first full 
year of Switch sales. Despite this, we do not forecast any such hike during the 
launch of Nintendo’s next console for the following reason: compared to its 
predecessor, Switch was (and is) a remarkable success, which led revenues to 
more than double in a year, and surely had a large impact on the working capital. 
In contrast to this, we expect the next console to have similar sales figures and, 
therefore, no comparable impact on the structure of working capital. It is 
important to note that the company has a policy in place, that states that future 
growth, including capital investments, cannot be funded using external capital. 
This principle connects to the zero debt and vast cash reserves that Nintendo 
has. 
A separate task was to split Nintendo’s cash balance between operating and 
excess cash. Nintendo sits on a cash pile that represents 72% of its revenues in 
2019 and was proportionally as high as 141% in 2017. Unfortunately, the 
company does not disclose how much cash it needs to cover operational needs, 
so we employed an approach described by A. Damodaran in his 2005 paper 
“Dealing with Cash, Cross Holdings and Other Non-Operating Assets: 
 
 








Approaches and Implications” (Damodaran, 2005): looking at industry 
benchmarks as proxies, presuming that aggregated on the industry level, there is 
no excess cash. To do this, we split Nintendo’s revenues across two categories: 
software, benchmarked against the entertainment software industry, and 
hardware, benchmarked against consumer electronics – and then took the 
weighted average operating cash holdings as a percentage of revenues. The 
output varied throughout the years considered in the range of 14.5%-15.5%. 
On the capital investments side, Nintendo uses funds mainly for R&D facilities. 
Meanwhile, the R&D expenditures, especially when it comes to building video 
game software, are so inherent to Nintendo’s business that the company does 
not capitalize them, and instead expenses them on the P&L statement. To 
forecast CAPEX, we projected all major lines of PP&E, although Nintendo does 
not specify any major planned investments or divestitures of its fixed assets. 
Depending on the situation (stable trend or big fluctuations), we assumed either 
5-year median, last year’s, or 0% growth rate (like in case of land, which suffered 
an 8.5% impairment loss in 2019 but otherwise did not change meaningfully in 
the past years).  
Discounted Cash Flow Analysis 
Cost of Capital 
In order to quantify Nintendo´s weighted average cost of capital (WACC), it was 
necessary to gather information on comparable companies, market indexes and 
analyze Nintendo´s Equity and Debt structure. For the risk-free rate factor, we 
used the 10-year Japanese Government Bond. In order to calculate Nintendo´s 
beta, we used weekly returns over a three-year period, from December 2016 until 
December 2019, from Nintendo’s stock and Nikkei 225. We used a 95% 
confidence interval to assure the calculated beta. Our Market Risk Premium 
(MRP) was set as an average across mature markets since Nintendo operates 
globally and sourced from Aswath Damodaran (Damodaran, 2019). The 
regression output was Nintendo’s beta of 0.98, which indicates that the 
company’s stock is moving along with the market fluctuations (Table 7). To 
benchmark it against the peers, we looked at 14 major players in the video game 
market and found that the median levered beta for this group is 0.82, with the 
median unlevered beta being 0.71 (Table 8). In both cases, Nintendo’s beta turns 
out to be higher (relevering with Nintendo’s D/E of 0 yields the same result). With 
the exception of Square Enix, Nintendo had the highest unlevered beta across all 
its peers, with only Sony coming close (0.96). Although we are constrained by the 
small sample group, such result might indicate that pure software publishers, like 
Konami, and Capcom in Japan or Electronic Arts and Ubisoft in the West, are 
Source: Own Estimation 
Table 7: Regression on beta output 












inherently less risky (i.e. have lower betas) than platform holders like Nintendo 
and Sony, which produce both software and hardware. It is likely the hardware, 
both expensive and non-essential for a household, which takes a bigger hit 
during economic downturns and, therefore, creates additional risk. 
In order to establish Nintendo´s Capital Structure, we assumed a target D/E ratio 
of 0, historically, Nintendo does not have Debt. The company does not provide 
evidence that would change its capital structure soon, and it is one of its 
corporate principles that all new projects are financed with internal capital. Since 
Nintendo does not have any long-term and short-term bonds outstanding, we 
assumed book values are equal to market values. We assumed a tax rate of 
30.5%, which is the statutory tax rate. We used the CAPM formula to calculate 
Nintendo´s Cost of Equity and obtained 6.71%. As the company D/E ratio is 0, 
we arrived at a WACC of 6.71%. 
Forecasting Free Cash Flows 
Our next step was to conduct a Discounted Cash Flow analysis to value 
Nintendo. As Nintendo’s performance tends to have major fluctuations depending 
on where we are in the console’s lifecycle, our intention was to make the detailed 
forecast up to the point where the free cash flows stabilize – we believe that such 
trend will become more visible as the Switch gets phased out in favor of a new 
console. For this reason, we have made detailed forecasts up to 2028, after 
which we have assumed a terminal growth rate. In order to establish the terminal 
growth rate, we used the GDP growth rates of four Nintendo’s key geographies: 
Japan, America (implying the US since it stands for 87% of Nintendo’s sales in 
the region), Europe, and Other (for which we took the global GDP growth rate). 
These rates were weighted by their share in the overall net sales of Nintendo 
(Table 9). The output terminal growth rate amounted to 2.23%, which is 
consistent with the 2028 projected growth of 2.16% in core income and 2.37% in 
free cash flow. As an alternative to assuming a terminal growth rate, we also 
calculate the terminal value using an EV/EBITDA multiple, which stands at 14.66 
in the peer group. 
Although most risk factors disclosed in the annual report are too generic to price 
in – e.g. fluctuation of market environment, dependency on outside 
manufacturers – there is one particular development that is easily quantifiable. In 
2019, law firm Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith filed a class action 
lawsuit in the US against Nintendo, stating that the Switch controllers (Joy-Cons) 
are defective. So far, there is mostly anecdotal evidence, although a survey 
suggests that as many as 37% of Joy-Cons are defective (reddit, 2019). For the 
purposes of this valuation, we assume a 10% probability that the court will force 
Source: Own Estimation 
Table 9: Terminal growth breakdown 
 
 








Nintendo to either replace the defective Joy-Cons or repay its cost in cash. 
Knowing that a pair of Joy-Cons costs Nintendo $90 to produce, slightly above 
the retail price (Kinsley, 2017), we estimated a probability-weighted adverse 
impact of the litigation at ¥36.1 billion, paid out in the fiscal year 2024, as most 
class action cases take around three years to resolve (Table 10). 
Before proceeding to the projected share price, it is important to elaborate on 
how Nintendo views a fiscal year. Nintendo’s fiscal years are shifted compared to 
calendar years and are also forward-looking – e.g. the fiscal year 2019 ends in 
March 2019. Although Nintendo publishes quarterly results, they are not as 
detailed as their annual reports and, if we were to cut the fiscal year to maintain 
the proposed valuation date of 31st of December 2020, our forecast would lack 
the depth we believe it deserves. Therefore, this valuation is dated as of 31st of 
March 2021 – the month concluding the fiscal year that included 9 out of 12 
calendar months in 2020. 
We forecasted the company´s future performance up to the point where its 
revenues, ROIC, and free cash flows have all stabilized (Chart 29). Discounting 
the future cash flows of the core business and the terminal value with the prior 
computed WACC of 6.71%, we obtained a core enterprise value of ¥4,288 billion. 
Adding the non-core enterprise value to the core enterprise value we achieved a 
total enterprise value of ¥4,655 billion. Adding the Net Financial Assets to the 
total enterprise value leads to an Equity Value of ¥5,457 Billion (Chart 30). 
Assuming 131.669 million shares outstanding in 2022, the corresponding share 
price is ¥41,447.26. If we were to use a terminal value based on EV/EBITDA, as 
described above, the share price would be slightly lower at ¥40,439.72 As for the 
dividends, we forecast that Nintendo will pay out a dividend of ¥476.7 per share 
in 2020 and ¥512.2 in 2021. 
 To see how changes in key value drivers affect valuation, we conducted a 
sensitivity analysis, presented in Table 11. 







Source: reddit, NintendoToday, 
own estimation 
Table 10: Terminal growth breakdown 
Source: own estimation 
Chart 29: FCF forecast, ¥ m 
Chart 30: EV to Equity Value bridge, ¥ m 
Source: own estimation 
Source: own estimation 
 
 








One of the key insights here is that optimizing WACC can unlock lots of 
additional value, as a 1 percentage point decrease in WACC increases equity 
value by 19.3%. Given than the median WACC in the industry is 5.91% across 
the industry and 4.26% across Japanese peers, Nintendo can likely bring its 
WACC of 6.71% down by adding some debt into the equation. Similar results can 
be achieved if Nintendo manages to bring its cost of sales down from 59% to 
55%, although this seems like a more challenging goal. Overall, different 
combinations of WACC and terminal growth yield equity values from ¥4,372 
billion to ¥7,218 billion, while different levels of cost of sales and Switch lifecycle 
sales produce a range of ¥3,966 billion to ¥7,024 billion. This output also serves 
as a scenario analysis, as it shows how the recommendation would change 
based on value drivers. Equity values above ¥5,722 billion represent at least a 
“Hold” recommendation, while values above ¥6,294 billion represent “Buy”. 
Comparables 
After using the DCF method to value and analyze Nintendo, we performed a 
relative valuation against the same peer group used in the Cost of Capital 
section, in order to validate our results. We compared them across the most 
significant multiples: EV/Revenue, EV/EBITDA, P/E, and P/B (Table 12). At its 
current share price, Nintendo appears more expensive across all four multiples, 
although still in the ballpark of the median values. One possible explanation could 
be the dividend yield, which at 2.07% is almost triple the peer median of 0.74%. 
With the share price obtained through DCF, Nintendo’s multiples would still be 
above the peer median for EV/EBITDA and P/E, but below it for EV/Sales and 
P/B. 




















Valuation ranges suggested by relative valuation, contrasted with DCF and actual 
share price fluctuations, are presented in Chart 31. For these ranges, low and 
high values were determined by taking the respective quartiles of the peer group. 
Given that our recommendation is based on the share price obtained through the 
DCF, we conclude that Nintendo’s current share price of ¥43,970 is above the 


















Source: Own Estimation 














































































• Batchelor, James. “EA and Activision's $79bn Games-as-a-Service Growth.” GamesIndustry.biz, 
October 19, 2018. https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2018-10-19-ea-and-activisions-usd79bn-
games-as-a-service-growth. 
• Batchelor, James. “Nintendo ‘Evaluating’ Streaming, but Focused on Physical and Downloads.” 
GamesIndustry.biz, June 14, 2019. https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2019-06-14-nintendo-
evaluating-streaming-but-focused-on-physical-and-downloads. 
• Bobrov, Liron Hakim. “Gaming Consoles in 2018 – Microsoft, Nintendo & Sony.” Similarweb Blog, 
May 13, 2018. https://www.similarweb.com/blog/gaming-consoles-2018-microsoft-nintendo-sony. 
• Damodaran, Aswath. Dealing with Cash, Cross Holdings and Other Non-Operating Assets: 
Approaches and Implications. New York: New York University - Stern School of Business, 2005. 
• Damodaran, Aswath. “Country Default Spreads and Risk Premiums.” Stern School of Business, New 
York University, January 2019.  
• Gault, Matthew. “The 10 Best Video Games of the 2010s.” Time. Time, December 19, 2019. 
https://time.com/5752663/best-video-games-2010s-decade/. 
• Gough, Christina. “Fortnite Player Count 2019.” Statista, October 18, 2019. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/746230/fortnite-players/. 
• Hollister, Sean. “The World Is Waiting for Google Stadia to Flop.” The Verge, November 14, 2019. 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/14/20964386/google-stadia-pre-launch-editorial-cloud-gaming. 
• Hulfish, Garrett. “Nintendo Switch Owners Prefer Handheld to Docked Use (Barely).” Digital Trends, 
November 1, 2017. https://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/nintendo-switch-handheld-vs-docked/. 
• Irving, Michael. “A $400 Zelda Machine: Nintendo Switch Launch Day Impressions.” New Atlas, 
March 4, 2017. https://newatlas.com/nintendo-switch-review-first-impressions/48228/. 
• Johnson, Eric. “Most Mobile Game Players Quit After One Day (Exclusive).” Vox. Vox, April 9, 2014. 
https://www.vox.com/2014/4/9/11625416/most-mobile-game-players-quit-after-one-day-exclusive. 
• “Joy-Con Failure Rate Form.” reddit, July 17, 2019. 
https://www.reddit.com/r/NintendoSwitch/comments/ce9wfi/joycon_failure_rate_form/. 
• Kent, Emma. “15 European Gambling Regulators Unite to Tackle Loot Box Threat.” Eurogamer.net. 
Eurogamer.net, August 16, 2019. https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2018-09-17-15-european-
gambling-regulators-unite-to-tackle-loot-box-threat. 
• Kim, W. Chan, Renee Mauborgne, and Michael Olenick. “Nintendo Switch: Shifting from Market-












• Kinsley, John. “Teardown Firm: Joy-Con Controllers Cost Nintendo $90 to Manufacture.” 
NintendoToday, April 9, 2017. http://nintendotoday.com/teardown-firm-joy-con-controllers-cost-
nintendo-90-to-manufacture/. 
• Kunst, Alexander. “Gaming Brand Awareness in the U.S. 2016.” Statista, September 3, 2019. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/662663/gaming-brand-awareness-usa/. 
• Lanier, Liz. “Steam Now Has One Billion Accounts (And 90 Million Active Users).” Variety, April 30, 
2019. https://variety.com/2019/gaming/news/steam-one-billion-accounts-1203201159/. 
• November 21, 2019. “CD PROJEKT Summarizes the Third Quarter of 2019.” CD PROJEKT, 
November 21, 2019. https://www.cdprojekt.com/en/media/news/cd-projekt-summarizes-the-third-
quarter-of-2019/. 
• Radulovic, Petrana. “Everything We Know about Super Nintendo World.” Polygon. Polygon, July 8, 
2019. https://www.polygon.com/2019/7/8/18215682/super-nintendo-world-universal-studios-japan-
theme-park. 
• “Super Mario Film Announced by Nintendo.” BBC News. BBC, February 1, 2018. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-42900384. 
• Vanian, Jonathan. “Cloud Companies Microsoft, Amazon, and Google Are Competing to Support 
Video Game Streaming.” Fortune, July 19, 2019. https://fortune.com/longform/video-game-streaming/. 
• “Video Game Addiction: China Imposes Gaming Curfew for Minors.” BBC News. BBC, November 6, 
2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50315960 
• Webster, Andrew. “Nintendo Boss Bowser on Switch Lite Sales, 3DS Support, and Tiny Retro 
Consoles.” The Verge. The Verge, November 7, 2019. 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/7/20951926/nintendo-doug-bowser-interview-switch-lite-sales-
3ds-support-consoles. 
• Webster, Andrew. “The Nintendo Switch Had Its Best US Sales Week Ever Thanks to Black Friday.” 
The Verge. The Verge, December 4, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/4/20995584/nintendo-
switch-best-sales-week-black-friday. 
• Webster, Andrew. “Mario Kart Tour Was the Most Downloaded IPhone Game of 2019.” The Verge. 
The Verge, December 3, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/3/20992527/apple-iphone-ipad-
top-games-2019-mario-kart-call-of-duty-fortnite. 
• Wijman, Tom. “The Global Games Market Will Generate $152.1 Billion in 2019” Newzoo, June 18, 
2019. https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/the-global-games-market-will-generate-152-1-billion-in-
2019-as-the-u-s-overtakes-china-as-the-biggest-market/. 
• “With Viewership and Revenue Booming, Esports Set to Compete with Traditional Sports.” Syracuse 












Disclosures and Disclaimers 
Report  Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
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The business of video games is often described as hit-driven, which creates a lot of uncertainty for 
companies, particularly on the topics of earnings and return on investments. This paper attempts to shed 
some light on the features shared by video game best-sellers and find whether games published by Nintendo 
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Throughout this equity report, we have repeatedly stated that the video game market is largely hit-
driven and that producing such hits is key to the financial well-being of market participants. In the 
individual part of this report, I decided to look deeper into what kind of games become hits to see if it 
could offer any guidance in terms of maximizing the return on R&D investments. It is particularly 
important at a time when the production budgets are surpassing those of blockbuster movies (Call of 
Duty: Modern Warfare 3 cost $250 million to produce and promote), which increases the cost of failure. 
For this task, I worked on a dataset parsed from VGChartz (Alqunber, 2019), a major source of video 
game sales data. Although the data spanned from the 1980s, I decided to set cut off all data entries prior 
to 2000, the year that marked the start of the sixth generation of consoles and, even more importantly, 
the competition of Nintendo, Sony and Microsoft we know today. After cleaning the data, I was left with 
4,275 data instances. 
I chose the software units sold globally as the dependent variable. The control variables were grouped 
across the following categories: 
o  Average score. This variable reflects the average review rating of a particular game. 
Where it was possible, its value was calculated as the average between the critic 
score and the user score. In some cases these two scores are quite different: it is 
worth mentioning that video game publishers usually have warm relationship with 
the press, giving the latter early access to the games not yet released and paying the 
costs of attending video game conferences, all of which incentivizes video game 
journalists to keep the publishers satisfied with their coverage. My initial hypothesis 
with this variable was that games with better reviews sell more, although there exist 
some niche games that are highly rated by a small group of fans, yet these games 
remain largely unknown to masses. 
o  Genre. Genres exist in all types of media, from music to movies, but one can argue 
that differentiation is highest in games. For example, whereas most genres in movies 
differ substantially in tone and style, they still fit under the same set of rules: roughly 
two hours of screen time, three acts, etc. In contrast, in video games, a blockbuster 
adventure title can last for 8 hours and feature numerous movie-like scenes with 
high-definition graphics and a heavy focus on character development, while a JRPG 
(Japanese role-playing games) can pack up to 100 hours or relatively similar, 
repetitive gameplay with little to no dialogues. Yet both of these genres, which seem 
to be on the opposite extremes, have large fan bases. Still, my initial hypothesis with 
this variable was that action-packed, cinematic titles would sell better as they seem to 
be the centerpiece of marketing campaigns of the console manufacturers (Sony 
boasts franchises like Uncharted and The Last of Us, while Microsoft has Halo and 
Gears of War, and both platforms actively promote Call of Duty games). 
o  Platform. This variable controls for the console on which a game was released. This 
is important to consider because the hardware that sells poorly enters a vicious circle 
where a small user base demotivates game developers from publishing a game for 
this platform. This then leads to a scarcity of games on such console, which further 
hurts the hardware sales, and so on. The evidence of that can be found in Dreamcast, 
a console that Sega introduced in 1999, only to discontinue it two years later. 
Eventually, the failure Dreamcast pushed Sega (once known for its Mega Drive 
console, which sold 35 million units) out of the console business, emphasizing how 
high the stakes are in the video game hardware business. 
o  Nintendo dummy. This variable is 1 for titles published by Nintendo (in most cases, 
that also implies exclusivity for Nintendo’s consoles) and 0 for all others. The 
rationale behind this variable is that Nintendo owns a range of extremely attractive 
IP with large fan bases worldwide, thus allowing Nintendo to repeatedly publish 
best-selling games even if they do not feature the most innovate gameplay or 
graphics. Some anecdotal evidence of that can be found in the fact that Nintendo’s 
first-party games, unlike most of the rest, almost never go on sale (Kaser, 2018). 
Therefore, my hypothesis for this variable is that Nintendo-published should sell 
better, all else being equal. 
To estimate the impact of the variables described above on the sales of video game software, I used 
an OLS simple linear regression. The output of the regression, i.e. its coefficients, is described in Table 
1. Although the R-Squared is only 0.164, most variables have sufficiently low p-values. 
Looking at the coefficients, there are a few curious conclusions we can infer. First, confirming my 
initial hypothesis, games with better reviews in the press and among the users tend to sell more units. 
When it comes to genres, however, the results are not as obvious. For once, action and action-adventure 
games do not seem to perform much better, with coefficients of just 0.08 and 0.01 respectively, although 
shooter games performed better (0.23) Furthermore, pure adventure games have a negative correlation 
with overall sales.  
Conversely, the most successful categories were the following: MMO (0.45), party (1.74) and racing 
(0.28). The MMO (massively multiplayer online) category is, for a large part, driven by sales of World 
of Warcraft – the only game that managed to persuade players to buy a full-price game and then pay a 
monthly subscription to continue playing for 10 years – and its expansions. Party games have a more 
even distribution of sales, with a number of titles selling more than 1 million units despite mixed reviews. 
Finally, racing games are clearly dominated by Nintendo, with various entries in the Mario Kart series 
occupying the first four spots in the list of racing best-sellers. Interestingly enough, the next four spots 
go to Sony and its Gran Turismo series, which indicates that this genre is somewhat of a duopoly in 
terms of sales concentration. Unlike party games, highest-grossing racing games also tend to have 
excellent reviews (all titles in top 20 have an average rating of at least 8 out of 10). 
In terms of console-specific controls, most of the results are in line with expectations, as more popular 
consoles contribute positively to software sales and vice versa. There is one output, however, that 
requires explanation. The dummy variable responsible for Switch games has a negative coefficient of -
0.55. That appears to be counterintuitive, given the current sales momentum for Switch hardware. A few 
explanations can be used to address this result: first, Switch was released less than three years ago and 
is now hardly in the middle of its lifetime, which in turn means that the software sales are far from its 
overall potential. Therefore, comparing sales of fresh Switch titles with lifelong sales of games published 
5 or more years ago biases the outcome against the Switch games. Second, Switch was released years 
later than other consoles in the same generation. It could then be the case that cross-platform games, 
originally developed for PlayStation 4 or Xbox One and then ported to Switch, have largely exhausted 
their sales potential by the time of their Switch release.  
Finally, the regression output confirms my initial hypothesis that games published by Nintendo tend 
to perform better. With the coefficient of 2.63, this is the single largest factor positively affecting 
correlation with units sold. 
        Appendix 
Table 1. Regression output 
Feature Coefficient 
Average score 0.42 
Genre: action 0.08 
Genre: action-adventure 0.01 
Genre: adventure -0.57 
Genre: fighting -0.15 
Genre: MMO 0.45 
Genre: miscellaneous 0.21 
Genre: music -0.46 
Genre: party 1.74 
Genre: platform 0.11 
Genre: puzzle -0.94 
Genre: racing 0.28 
Genre: role-playing -0.24 
Genre: sandbox 0.76 
Genre: shooter 0.23 
Genre: simulation 0.11 
Genre: sports 0.13 
Genre: strategy -0.69 
Genre: visual novel -1.05 




Platform: Nintendo DS 0.29 
Platform: Nintendo 
Game Boy Advanced 
-0.45 
Platform: Nintendo 








Platform: PC 0.04 
Platform: PlayStation 0.38 
Platform: PlayStation 2 0.62 
Platform: PlayStation 3 0.47 







Platform: Nintendo Wii 0.77 
Platform: Nintendo Wii 
U 
-1.20 
Platform: Xbox 360 0.36 
Platform: Xbox -0.28 
Platform: Xbox One 0.49 
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